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Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in 
Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Edward R. Morrisont 
Executive orders, statutes, and precedent increasingly re- 
quire cost-benefit analysis of regulations. Presidential executive 
orders have long required executive agencies to submit regulatory 
impact analyses' to the Office of Management and Budget 
("OMB") before issuing regulations,2 and recent federal egislation 
exhibits a trend toward mandatory cost-benefit analysis. For ex- 
ample, the Toxic Substances Control Act,3 the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act,4 and the recent Safe Drinking 
Water Act Amendments5 require the Environmental Protection 
Agency to balance costs and benefits in regulating chemicals and 
pesticides. In 1995, Congress passed the Unfunded Mandates 
Act,6 requiring cost-benefit analysis of all significant federal 
regulations that require expenditures by state, local, or tribal 
governments.7 Additionally, Congress has proposed several bills 
t B.S. 1994, University of Utah; AM. (Economics) 1997, The University of Chicago; 
Ph.D. (Economics) Candidate 2000, J.D. Candidate 2000, The University of Chicago. 
1 A regulatory impact analysis assesses the potential costs and benefits (both mone- 
tary and nonmonetary) of a rule. EO 12291, 46 Fed Reg 13193, 13194 (1981). The report 
contains a "description of alternative approaches that could substantially achieve the 
same regulatory goal at lower cost, together with an analysis of this potential benefit and 
costs and a brief explanation of the legal reasons why such alternatives, if proposed, could 
not be adopted." Id. 
2 Although previous administrations i sued executive orders encouraging agencies to 
consider the economic impact of proposed regulations, President Reagan's executive order, 
EO 12291, 46 Fed Reg 13193, was the first o require cost-benefit analysis. Section 2 of EO 
12291 required agencies to ensure that the social benefits of a proposed regulation exceed 
its social costs. Id. In 1993, President Clinton issued EO 12866, 58 Fed Reg 51735 (1993), 
which generally afflrms the approach of the Reagan order. Unlike Reagan's order, how- 
ever, EO 12866 ? l(b) merely endorses cost-benefit analysis as a tool for evaluating regula- 
tory options and does not require that benefits outweigh costs. 58 Fed Reg at 51735-36. 
See generally Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 
62 U Chi L Rev 1, 3-7 (1995) (comparing the different approaches of the Reagan and 
Clinton executive orders); OMB, Draft Report o Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Fed- 
eral Regulations, 62 Fed Reg 39352, 39355-57 (1997) (describing the development of 
regulatory analyses in successive administrations). 
3 15 USC ? 2605(c)(1) (1994). 
4 7 USC ? 136(bb) (1994). 
5 42 USCA ? 300g-1(b)(3) (1991 & Supp 1998). 
6 Pub L No 104-4, 109 Stat 48 (1995), codified at 2 USCA ?? 1501 et seq (1997). 
7 2 USCA ? 1532(a). 
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that would require federal agencies to apply cost-benefit analysis 
to all rules.8 
This trend raises important questions about the methods 
agencies use to conduct cost-benefit analysis. To perform the 
analysis, an agency must first quantify the stream of costs and 
benefits that a regulation will generate in current and future pe- 
riods.9 Quantification, however, is not enough. Because of the 
time value of money (that is, a dollar today can be invested to 
yield more than a dollar tomorrow), costs and benefits in different 
periods are different "goods" and are not strictly comparable. 
Therefore, the agency must choose a discount rate that will con- 
vert future sums into present values. It can then use these pres- 
ent values to compute the net benefit (or "net present value") of 
the regulation. 
Discount rates fundamentally influence judgments about the 
need for and the effectiveness of cost-benefit analysis. In 1986, 
OMB economist John Morrall documented extreme variation in 
the value that regulations implicitly place on human life.10 On the 
low end, a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
("NHTSA") regulation cost $100,000 per life saved;"1 on the high 
end, an Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
("OSHA") rule cost $72 billion per life saved.12 Although this 
study has greatly influenced recent congressional and academic 
proposals for regulatory reform,"3 emerging scholarship shows 
that Morrall's results depended critically on the discount rate he 
' See, for example, Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act of 1995, HR 1022, 104th 
Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 23, 1995); Regulatory Improvement Act of 1997, S 981, 105th Cong, 2d 
Sess (June 27, 1997). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, 
and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 Stan L Rev 247, 269-86 (1996) (describing regulatory reform 
efforts of the 104th Congress); Thomas 0. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future 
of the Regulatory State, 63 U Chi L Rev 1463, 1528-32 (1996) (same). 
9 This Comment ignores 'incommensurability' issues-whether the value of life or 
other nonmonetary benefits can be measured 'along a single metric without doing violence 
to our considered judgments about how these goods are best characterized." Cass R. Sun- 
stein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich L Rev 779, 796 (1994). 
10 John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, Regulation 25, 30 table 4 (Nov/Dec 
1986). 
"Initial Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 32 Fed Reg 2408, 2414-15 (1967). 
12 Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 50 Fed Reg 50412 (1985). 
See, for example, Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale 
L J 1981 (1998). Heinzerling notes, id at 1983 n 2, that Morrall's statistics underlie Ste- 
phen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation 24-27 (Har- 
vard 1993). For other commentary relying on Morrall's work, see Pildes and Sunstein, 62 
U Chi L Rev at 105 & n 363 (cited in note 2); John D. Graham, The Risk Not Reduced, 3 
NYU Envir L J 382, 398 n 79 (1994); W. Kip Viscusi, Equivalent Frames of Reference for 
Judging Risk Regulation Policies, 3 NYU Envir L J 431, 449-50 n 42 (1994). 
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chose, which differed markedly from the rates NHTSA and OSHA 
actually employed.14 
The Morall study is just one example of how small variations 
in the discount rate can have very large effects on the results of 
cost-benefit analysis. Consider, for example, a proposed regula- 
tion that will generate $100 in benefits in fifty ears. The present 
value15 of this benefit is $61 at a 1 percent discount rate, $14 at 4 
percent, $3 at 7 percent, and less than $1 at 10 percent. Unfortu- 
nately, despite the importance of the discount rate in cost-benefit 
analysis, few standards guide agency practice. Although OMB 
has issued discount rate guidelines since 1972,16 discount rates 
vary significantly within and across agencies. 
Few courts have reviewed agency discount rates, in part be- 
cause relatively few statutes require agencies to conduct cost- 
benefit analysis, and in part because there are no meaningful 
standards of review for courts to apply. When courts have ad- 
dressed the issue, they have either deferred to agency discretion 
or imposed their own judgments about discounting. The absence 
of standards for discounting is particularly troubling as cost- 
benefit analysis has played an ever greater role in new legisla- 
tion. Although several legal scholars have discussed this problem, 
none has considered how economic theory can assist courts in re- 
viewing agency discount rates.17 
This Comment develops a framework for judicial review of an 
agency's choice of discount rate. Part I discusses the striking 
variation in the discount rates agencies use. Part II analyzes the 
economic theory of discounting and develops a simple conceptual 
framework for evaluating particular discount rates. Finally, Part 
III uses this conceptual framework to establish a standard of re- 
" See Heinzerling, 107 Yale L J at 1984-85 (cited in note 13). 
16 The general formula for computing the present value (in discrete time) of a sum X 
paid in n years, where the discount rate is r, is X/(1 + r)-. Thus, when the discount rate is 
5 percent, the present value of $100 paid in 50 years is 100/(1 + .05)50 = $8.72. 
16 See OMB, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs; Guidelines and Discounts, 57 
Fed Reg 53519, 53520 (1992), replacing and rescinding OMB Circular No A-94, Discount 
Rate to be Used in Evaluating Time-Distributed Costs and Benefits (Mar 27, 1972). 
17 One article has explored the appropriate discount rate policy for regulatory agen- 
cies. Daniel A. Farber and Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount 
Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 Vand L Rev 267 (1993). The authors, 
however, do not address the appropriate standard of judicial review. Other commentators 
have discussed agency discount rates without reference to judicial review. See, for exam- 
ple, Heinzerling, 107 Yale L J at 2043-56 (cited in note 13); Bradford C. Mank, Protecting 
the Environment for Future Generations: A Proposal for a 'Republican" Superagency, 5 
NYU Envir L J 444, 460-62 (1996). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 
64 U Chi L Rev 1175, 1193-94 (1997). 
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view that courts may apply when reviewing an agency's choice of 
discount rate. 
I. AGENCY PRACTICE: LARGE VARIATION WITHIN AND 
ACROSS AGENCIES 
Agencies exhibit striking inconsistencies in their use of dis- 
count rates. Not only do different agencies use significantly dif- 
ferent rates, but often a single agency employs very different 
rates for various regulations. Administrative records offer little 
explanation for this variation. 
In an effort to standardize agency cost-benefit analysis, OMB 
has issued discount rate guidelines ince 1972.18 The most recent 
guidelines, published in 1992, recommend a 7 percent real"9 dis- 
count rate for analysis of all "public investments and regulatory 
programs that provide benefits and costs to the general public."20 
OMB asserts that this rate "approximates the marginal pretax 
rate of return on an average investment in the private sector in 
recent years."2' However, OMB acknowledges that alternative 
rates may be appropriate in some cases.22 
OMB's guidelines appear to have had little effect on the dis- 
count rates that agencies actually use.23 This is evident in Tables 
1 and 2 (following this Comment), which survey the discount 
rates agencies have employed uring the past five years. Table 1 
focuses on long-term regulations that provide costs or benefits 
over thirty or more years. Some agencies, such as the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") and the Food and 
Drug Administration ("FDA"), have used a relatively low rate of 3 
percent; others, such as the Environmental Protection Agency 
("EPA") and the Bureau of Reclamation, have employed rates in 
excess of 7 percent. Further, individual agencies have used differ- 
ent rates for different regulations. The EPA, for example, em- 
18 See OMB, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, 57 Fed Reg at 53520 (cited in 
note 16). 
19 A real discount rate (as opposed to a nominal rate) excludes the premium for ex- 
pected inflation. 
OMB, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, 57 Fed Reg at 53522-23 (cited in 
note 16). Prior to 1992, OMB recommended a 10 percent rate. OMB, Guidelines and Dis- 
count Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, 57 Fed Reg 35613, 35613-14 
(1992). 
21 OMB, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, 57 Fed Reg at 53523 (cited in note 
16). 
22 An agency, however, must gain OMB permission to use alternative discount rates, 
such as the 'shadow price of capital," instead of the recommended 7 percent rate. Id. 
OMB has acknowledged as much. See OMB, Draft Report o Congress, 62 Fed Reg at 
39379 (cited in note 2), where OMB notes that the EPA did not use the recommended dis- 
count rate in conducting its analysis of its lead-based paint rule. 
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ployed a 3 percent discount rate for regulations of lead-based 
paint but used 7 and 10 percent rates for regulations of drinking 
water and emissions from locomotives. This variation in discount 
rates has profound effects on the analysis of long-term regula- 
tions. Consider the HUD regulation of lead-based paint.24 While 
that regulation had net benefits of $1,080.2 million at a 3 percent 
discount rate, it had net benefits of only $39 million at a 7 per- 
cent rate.25 Although HUD acknowledged this, it favored the 3 
percent rate merely because the regulation affected future gen- 
erations.26 
Slightly less inconsistency characterizes agency analyses of 
short-term regulations that yield benefits and costs within the 
next twenty ears. Table 2 shows that most agencies use discount 
rates between 7 and 10 percent. However, there is still significant 
variation: several agencies, such as the EPA27 and the FDA,28 
have used 3 percent rates. 
The administrative record offers little explanation for the 
selection of discount rates. Many agencies employ discount rates 
without discussing the theoretical or political reasons for choos- 
ing a particular rate.29 This seems particularly true for the EPA.30 
II. THE THEORY OF DISCOUNT RATES 
Scholars have long debated what discount rate is appropriate 
for regulations and other public projects. The debate has ethical, 
political, and economic dimensions. On one level, scholars debate 
the threshold issue of whether it is sound public policy for regula- 
4 HUD, Requirements for Notification, Evaluation and Reduction of Lead-Based Paint 
Hazards in Federally Owned Residential Property and Housing Receiving Federal Assis- 
tance, 61 Fed Reg 29170 (1996). 
25 Id at 29189. 
26 Id. HUD noted that EPA also uses a 3 percent rate. Id. 
See EPA, Comprehensive Guideline for Procurement of Products Containing Recov- 
ered Materials, 62 Fed Reg 60962, 60970 (1997) (employing a 3 percent rate over a ten- 
year period). 
' See Department of Health and Human Services, Tobacco Regulation for Substance 
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block Grants, 61 Fed Reg 1492, 1504, 1506 (1996) (pre- 
senting benefit-cost analysis results using both 3 and 7 percent discount rates). 
' Rare exceptions include the Department of Energy's regulation on energy conserva- 
tion standards for consumer products, see Department of Energy, Energy Conservation 
Program for Consumer Products, 58 Fed Reg 47326, 47333-35 (1993), and the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration rules on natural resource damage assessments, 
see Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Natu- 
ral Resource Damage Assessments, 61 Fed Reg 440, 453-54 (1996), where the agencies jus- 
tify their decisions to depart from OMB guidelines. See discussion in Part III.C. 
' See, for example, EPA, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone; Labeling, 58 Fed Reg 
8136, 8163 (1993) (offering alternative conclusions using a 2 percent and 7 percent rate 
without providing an explanation for using either discount rate). 
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tory agencies to discount future benefits, especially when those 
benefits accrue to future generations. On another level, given the 
choice to discount future costs and benefits, the debate becomes 
more economic. Here scholars disagree whether regulatory agen- 
cies should derive the appropriate discount rate from rates of re- 
turn in financial markets or from a normative model of 
intergenerational social welfare. 
This Part surveys both levels of the debate. Part A addresses 
the ethical, political, and economic debate over the threshold e- 
cision to discount future costs and benefits, demonstrating that 
sound public policy requires a regulatory agency to discount fu- 
ture sums. Part B surveys the economic and political debate over 
the appropriate discount rate. Finally, Part C synthesizes the 
discussion in this Part and develops a simple conceptual frame- 
work for choosing and evaluating discount rates. 
A. The Philosophical Approach to Discount Rates 
Philosophers,31 legal scholars,32 and several economists33 have 
questioned the ethical and logical theory underlying the decision 
to discount future costs and benefits to future generations. A 
strong intuition suggests that individual ives today are no more 
or less valuable than lives in the future.34 Just as a person's life 
should not be treated as less valuable because the person lives 
one hundred miles away, so too a life should not be treated as less 
valuable because it will exist one hundred years in the future. 
Thus philosophers and some economists have argued that a 
zero discount rate should be used when evaluating projects with 
consequences that may benefit or harm future generations.35 This 
31 See, for example, Derek Parfit, Rationality and Time, 1983/84 Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 47, 79-81; Derek Parfit, Energy Policy and the Further Future: The 
Social Discount Rate, in Douglas MacLean and Peter G. Brown, eds, Energy and the Fu- 
ture 31-37 (Rowman and Littlefield 1983); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 284-303 
(Belknap 1971). 
32 See, for example, Farber and Hemmersbaugh, 46 Vand L Rev at 289-300 (cited in 
note 17); Mank, 5 NYU Envir L J at 448-50, 460-62 (cited in note 17). 
3 See, for example, R.F. Harrod, Towards a Dynamic Economics: Some Recent Devel- 
opments of Economic Theory and their Application to Policy 37-40 (Macmillan 1948); A.C. 
Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 24-26 (Macmillan 4th ed 1932); F.P. Ramsey, A Mathe- 
matical Theory of Saving, in J.M. Keynes and D.H. MacGregor, eds, The Economic Jour- 
nal: The Journal of the Royal Economic Society 543 (Macmillan 1928); Robert M. Solow, 
The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics, 64 Am Econ Rev: Papers and 
Proceedings 1, 7-14 (1974). 
See Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 203 (Yale 1980). 
See id at 203; Harrod, Towards a Dynamic Economics at 45 (cited in note 33); Parfit, 
Energy Policy at 31, 36-37 (cited in note 31); Ramsey, A Mathematical Theory of Saving at 
554 (cited in note 33); Solow, 64 Am Econ Rev: Papers and Proceedings at 9 (cited in note 
33). 
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approach recognizes that harms to future generations deserve no 
less protection than harms to the current generation. As the re- 
nowned economist Frank Ramsey explained: "[I]t is assumed that 
we do not discount later enjoyments in comparison with earlier 
ones, a practice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely 
from the weakness of the imagination."36 
Some commentators go further, arguing that the "present 
generation has a fiduciary responsibility to see that future gen- 
erations enjoy a parity of social value and opportunity."37 This fi- 
duciary duty implies that the welfare of future generations, espe- 
cially nearer ones, should be treated on par with (that is to say, 
not discounted relative to) the welfare of the current generation.38 
This argument for zero discounting, however, does not deny 
the time value of money-that a dollar tomorrow is worth less 
than a dollar today (because a dollar can be invested today and 
yield more than a dollar tomorrow). Indeed, proponents of zero 
discount rates likely would agree that society should discount a 
monetary sum payable to future generations. Society can be- 
queath that benefit to future generations imply by investing a 
smaller sum in financial markets today. Rather, proponents of 
zero discounting argue that regulators should not discount non- 
monetary benefits to future generations. Putting aside difficult 
commensurability problems, society cannot bequeath these bene- 
fits to future generations merely by investing in financial mar- 
kets. This is especially true for environmental, health, and other 
less tangible benefits that future generations may be unable to 
"buy," because previous generations caused irreversible damage 
to the resources that provide these benefits. For example, if cur- 
rent society improperly stores nuclear waste and leakage causes 
the death of a child in some future generation, no sum will enable 
the parent to "buy" back the child's life. 
While reasonable, the ethical intuition that the state should 
not discount benefits to future generations suffers from two 
weaknesses. First, this ethical standard can beget apparently un- 
ethical results. If the current generation is morally obligated to 
treat the welfare of future generations on par with its own wel- 
fare, then logic dictates that the current generation has a duty to 
undertake almost any sacrifice, short of starvation, to benefit he 
' Ramsey, A Mathematical Theory of Saving at 261 (cited in note 33). 
Mank, 5 NYU Envir L J at 448 (cited in note 17), referring toAckerman, Social Jus- 
tice at 203 (cited in note 34). See also Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 284-93 (cited in note 
31); Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law and the Environment 63 
(Cambridge 1988). 
' See Farber and Hemmersbaugh, 46 Vand L Rev at 298-99 (cited in note 17). 
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future.39 By foregoing consumption today and investing in proj- 
ects that provide a stream of benefits for future generations, the 
current generation suffers a finite sacrifice but generates an infi- 
nite benefit (due to zero discounting) for the future.40 Indeed, the 
moral intuition of zero discounting implies that it may be optimal 
for the current generation to save two-thirds or more of its an- 
nual income.4' This is unacceptable, however, for "individuals are 
not morally required to subscribe fully to morality at any cost to 
themselves."42 Further, while the argument against discounting 
seems compelling where future harms (such as the death of a 
child) are irreversible, this argument is too powerful. Most, if not 
all, regulations today seek to prevent some form of irreversible 
damage in the future, perhaps in future generations. Therefore, 
even the argument against discounting irreversible damage 
would generate xcessive sacrifice today. 
Second, the moral intuition of zero discounting rests on the 
questionable assumption that government policy should be based 
on moral introspection rather than individuals' actual behavior. 
Unless there is evidence that the current generation is not suffi- 
ciently altruistic toward future generations (evidence of a market 
failure), the observed behavior of individuals may be the most re- 
liable indicator of the beliefs and values that should dictate policy 
choices in a democracy. Relative to the government, parents (the 
current generation) probably have superior information about op- 
timal investments in the welfare of their children (future genera- 
tions). Further, even if surveys indicate that a majority of the 
members of the current generation favors a zero discount rate, 
this finding is not persuasive if individuals in society behave as if 
they discount he future.43 Discounting may be a good description 
' See Kenneth J. Arrow, Discounting, Morality, and Gaming 3-8, working paper (Dec 
24, 1996), available online at <http://www-econ.stanford.edu/econ/wk-workp/swp970004. 
html> (visited July 6, 1998). 
40 See id at 5. 
41 See id at 6-7, developing a simple model of optimal investment and saving in a world 
that lasts forever. Empirical estimates of the model's parameters uggest hat the optimal 
savings rate is two-thirds orgreater. 
42 Id at 2. Philosophers and legal scholars reject this criticism, claiming that it con- 
fuses intergenerational efficiency and intergenerational equity. See Tyler Cowen and 
Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in Peter Laslett and James S. Fishkin, 
eds, Justice between Age Groups and Generations 148-49 (Yale 1992); Farber and Hem- 
mersbaugh, 46 Vand L Rev at 291-92 (cited in note 17). In reality, society maximizes two 
objectives: total welfare and intergenerational equity. See Cowen and Parfit, Against the 
Social Discount Rate at 149 ("[W]e should not simply aim for the greatest net sum of bene- 
fits. We should have a second moral aim: that these benefits be fairly shared between dif- 
ferent generations."), citing Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 297-98 (cited in 31). 
4 For a well-known statement of this principle of economic modeling, see Milton 
Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in Kurt R. Leube, ed, The Essence of 
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of individual behavior, and a good guide for public policy, re- 
gardless of whether individuals believe they discount the future 
or not." 
B. The Economic Approach to Discount Rates 
Economic theory offers two principal theories for discounting 
costs and benefits to future generations: the opportunity cost of 
capital ("OCC") and the social rate of time preference ("SRTP"). 
Both theories provide strong political and ethical support for posi- 
tive discount rates. However, economists disagree whether the 
OCC or SRTP should guide regulators.45 Although the two theo- 
ries are logically consistent,46 they generate very different dis- 
count rates in practice. The SRTP yields relatively low rates, 
around 1 to 3 percent.47 In contrast, the OCC generally produces 
rates in excess of 5 percent.'t This Part introduces the two theo- 
ries and reviews the major issues underlying the debate. 
1. Opportunity cost of capital. 
a) The economic theory. The cost of a public investment is 
not merely the value of the resources consumed. It also includes 
the opportunity cost of those resources. The opportunity cost re- 
flects the value of the next best use of the resources, such as in- 
vestment in the private sector. Consider, for example, a proposed 
regulation that costs $1 million today and promises to reduce 
Friedman 161-66 (Hoover Institution 1987). 
" Kenneth J. Arrow has demonstrated that this is actually the case in 
Intergenerational Equity and the Rate of Discount in Long-Term Social Investment 19-20, 
working paper (Dec 1995), available online at <http://www-econ.stanford.edu/econ/workp/ 
swp97005.html> (visited July 5, 1998). Even in a world where each generation wants to 
treat all future generations equally, every generation will behave as if it discounts the fu- 
ture. This occurs because, as the philosophical critique recognizes, no generation will 
make excessive sacrifices for the future. Every generation is slightly selfish. Consequently, 
each generation strategically decides how many resources to transfer to the next genera- 
tion, given that the next generations may decide not to transfer these resources to the fur- 
ther future. The result of this strategic interaction is a savings rate that corresponds to a 
positive rate of discount on the welfare of future generations. 
46 See id at 3-10. 
46 See Robert C. Lind, A Primer on the Major Issues Relating to the Discount Rate for 
Evaluating National Energy Options, in Robert C. Lind, ed, Discounting for Time and Risk 
in Energy Policy 27 (Resources for the Future 1982). 
4 See Kenneth J. Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity, Discounting and Economic Effi- 
ciency, in James P. Bruce, Hoesung Lee, and Erik F. Haites, eds, Climate Change 1995 
131-33 (Cambridge 1996); Richard D. Morgenstern, Conducting an Economic Analysis: 
Rationale, Issues, and Requirements, inRichard D. Morgenstem, ed, Economic Analyses at 
EPA: Assessing Regulatory Impact 36 (Resources for the Future 1997). 
' See Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity at 132-33 (cited in note 47); Morgenstern, 
Conducting an Economic Analysis at 36 (cited in note 47). 
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pollutants that will cause damaging climate change in fifty ears. 
If nothing is done to control the pollutants today, fifty ears from 
now future society will suffer damage requiring $10 million in 
abatement costs. At first blush, the regulation appears attractive: 
a $1 million investment avoids a $10 million expenditure in the 
future. No conclusion about the desirability of the regulation can 
be drawn, however, without considering the next best use of the 
$1 million investment today. If the resources could be invested in 
an asset, such as a long-term bond with a 5 percent return, soci- 
ety would be better served if the government avoided the regula- 
tion: the bond would yield over $10 million in fifty ears,49 leaving 
future generations with more than enough resources to combat 
the environmental damage. In other words, at a 5 percent dis- 
count rate, the proposed regulation does not pass the cost-benefit 
test because it has a negative net present value. 
A standard measure of the opportunity cost of a public in- 
vestment is the interest rate on assets with similar risk and du- 
ration in private financial markets. Public investment generally 
displaces private investment because it takes resources out of the 
private sector, either directly (through taxes) or indirectly 
(through the private costs of complying with regulations).50 Pri- 
vate assets, therefore, represent he next best investment oppor- 
tunities for the resources used for public investments.5' 
The fundamental intuition underlying the OCC approach is 
that the government should choose projects that maximize the re- 
sources available to future generations, not those that maximize 
particular aspects of future welfare, such as environmental well- 
being. Because the current generation cannot know the economic 
constraints facing future generations, it is better for the current 
generation to invest in their general well-being by choosing the 
projects with the highest rates of return. As proponents of this 
approach argue: 
Insofar as we today should consider the welfare of future 
generations, our duty lies not in leaving them exactly the so- 
cial and environmental life we think they ought to have, but 
rather in making it possible for them to inherit a climate of 
open choices-that is, in leaving behind a larger level of gen- 
eral fluid resources to be redirected as they, not we, see fit.52 
4 The actual payoff of the bond would be ($1,000,000)x(1.05)50=$11,467,340. 
' See, for example, Arrow, Intergenerational Equity at 7 (cited in note 44); William J. 
Baumol, On the Social Rate of Discount, 58 Am Econ Rev 788, 789-93 (1968). 
5 See generally Discounting an Uncertain Future, FEEM Newsletter 24 (Dec 1997). 
52 Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity at 133 (cited in note 47), quoting Aaron Wildav- 
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b) Applying the economic theory. The OCC is a descriptive 
approach to the choice of a social discount rate.53 The approach 
assumes that the price system-in particular, the rate of return 
available in financial markets-accurately reflects the scarcity of 
resources, expectations about the future, and societal preferences 
regarding future consumption vis-a-vis current consumption. The 
OCC approach makes no assumption about what the social dis- 
count rate should be. 
The OCC approach, however, is complicated and may not be 
appropriate for evaluating all public projects. Critics have identi- 
fied several limitations to the OCC approach. To begin, the OCC 
is not directly observable. Rates of return in financial markets in- 
clude premia for risk,54 the expected rate of inflation, and taxes 
that should not affect the social discount rate. Scholars have 
shown that once these factors are subtracted, the discount rate 
(in real terms) will generally exceed 5 percent, but it may be as 
low as 1 percent.55 The particular rate will vary over time and will 
change with expectations regarding the welfare of future genera- 
tions. Critics, however, note that it is very difficult to adjust ob- 
served rates of return for taxation, risk, and other factors.56 
sky, Searching for Safety 216 (Transaction Books 1988). 
See Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity at 132-33 (cited in note 47). 
Although risk-averse investors demand a premium to compensate for the risk of an 
asset, most scholars agree that no such premium is necessary for government investments 
because (1) the government's investment portfolio (its collection of regulations and in- 
vestments) is sufficiently broad to eliminate most diversifiable risk, see Baumol, 58 Am 
Econ Rev at 794 (cited in note 50), and (2) even if a government investment is risky, the 
cost of risk-bearing is trivial when it is spread among taxpayers, see Kenneth J. Arrow 
and Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions, 60 Am 
Econ Rev 364, 370-74 (1970). 
' See Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity at 133 (cited in note 47); Raymond J. Kopp 
and Paul R. Portney, Mock Referenda for Intergenerational Decisionmaking, 5 Discussion 
Paper 97-48 (Resources for the Future 1997), available online at <http://www.rff.org/ 
disc_papers/PDF_ files/9748.pdf> (visited July 5, 1998). 
' See Richard H. Thaler and George Loewenstein, Intertemporal Choice, in Richard H. 
Thaler, ed, The Winner's Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life 105-06 
(Princeton 1996). Additionally, some scholars object to the use of the OCC when an agency 
evaluates benefits to future generations because financial markets generally do not offer 
assets that pay out in future generations. See Farber and Hemmersbaugh, 46 Vand L Rev 
at 296-97 (cited in note 17); FEEM Newsletter, Discounting at 24-25 (cited in note 51). The 
OCC makes most sense where financial markets offer assets with term structures that are 
similar to regulations that agencies are considering. In such situations, the agency can di- 
rectly compare the payoff of the regulation to the payoff of the asset. Where the regulation 
involves intergenerational welfare, financial markets are unhelpful and therefore the OCC 
approach is inappropriate. This objection, however, merely points out a complication of the 
OCC; it does not undermine the approach. Financial markets will exist in future genera- 
tions, so there are trading strategies whereby individuals could invest sequentially in pri- 
vate assets that collectively have a duration comparable to the long-term public project. 
The expected rate of return on this strategy would be one logical discount rate for the 
public investment. 
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Additionally, critics note that the OCC approach assumes 
that public projects and regulations divert resources (via taxa- 
tion) from capital markets. To the contrary, evidence suggests 
that, in the absence of taxation, members of society would invest 
only a fraction of their resources in credit markets57 and would 
consume the rest. Therefore, to the extent that regulations are fi- 
nanced by resources that would otherwise be consumed, the OCC 
may overstate the appropriate rate of discount. Instead, the 
SRTP, which measures the rate at which society is willing to 
trade current and future consumption, may be closer to the rele- 
vant rate.58 
These considerations have led some economists to conclude 
that the appropriate discount rate may vary with the type of 
regulation or public project and how it is financed. When the gov- 
ernment relies on debt to finance the regulation, the OCC pro- 
vides more accurate results.59 When government relies on taxes, 
however, a combination of the OCC approach and the SRTP ap- 
proach may be more appropriate.60 At least one economist, how- 
ever, has questioned this notion that the discount rate should 
vary with the government's source of funds.6" Whether the state 
uses debt or taxes to finance regulations, it is essentially impos- 
ing a tax on production by diverting inputs from productive proc- 
esses (firms). Therefore, the appropriate discount rate will always 
be the OCC. 
2. Social rate of time preference. 
a) The economic theory. While the OCC relies on observable 
behavior to derive the social discount rate, the SRTP relies on 
theory to derive that rate. Standard economic theory hypothe- 
sizes,62 and empirical evidence confirms,63 that individuals value 
57 See Arrow, Intergenerational Equity at 9 (cited in note 44). 
5 See id; see also Lind, A Primer on the Major Issues at 29-32 (cited in note 46); Joel 
D. Scheraga, Perspectives on Government Discounting Policies, 18 J Envir Econ & Mgrnt S- 
65, S-67 (1990). The SRTP is discussed in the following Part. 
See, for example, Scheraga, 18 J Envir Econ & Mgmt at S-65 (cited in note 58). 
The appropriate discount rate would be a weighted average of the rates derived from 
the OCC and SRTP approaches, where the weights are approximately equal to the propor- 
tion of funds that displaces investment (for the OCC-based rate) and the proportion that 
displaces consumption (for the SRTP-based rate). See Larry A. Sjaastad and Daniel L. 
Wisecarver, The Social Cost of Public Finance, 85 J Pol Econ 513, 514-16 (1977). 
61 See Baumol, 58 Am Econ Rev at 791-92 (cited in note 50). 
62 See generally Maureen L. Cropper and Frances G. Sussman, Valuing Future Risks 
to Life, 19 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 160, 173-74 (1990) (applying standard theory to the 
problem of valuing future risks to life); Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, and 
Jerry R. Green, Microeconomic Theory 732-36 (Oxford 1995) (describing standard theory of 
intertemporal choice and the theory underlying discounting). 
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current consumption more than future consumption. The rate at 
which a person will trade (via a hypothetical asset) current for fu- 
ture consumption is known as the individual rate of time prefer- 
ence. Analogously, the social rate of time preference represents 
the rate at which members of society, on average, are willing to 
trade current benefits for future benefits. The appropriate meas- 
ure of the SRTP, however, depends on the government's theory of 
intergenerational welfare: different models of welfare imply dif- 
ferent measures of the SRTP. 
Most welfare models, in which the current government 
chooses projects to maximize the joint welfare of all generations, 
show that the SRTP can be written as the sum of two compo- 
nents: pure time preference and the growth rate of per capita in- 
come.' Pure time preference is a measure of preferences, reflect- 
ing each generation's desire (or impatience) to receive benefits 
sooner rather than later.65 The more impatient the present gen- 
eration, the higher the discount rate on benefits to future genera- 
tions. The growth rate of per capita income is a measure of scar- 
city, reflecting the relative incomes of different generations.' The 
higher the income of future generations relative to the current 
generation (that is, the higher the growth rate of per capita in- 
come), the higher the discount on benefits to future generations. 
The pure time preference component is controversial because 
it might reflect myopia, a special affinity for nearer generations, 
or some other defect in "our telescopic faculty" that should not 
guide government decisions about intergenerational welfare.67 
This criticism is valid insofar as the observed "myopia" of the cur- 
rent generation imposes some negative externality on future gen- 
6 See, for example, Michael J. Moore and W. Kip Viscusi, Discounting Environmental 
Health Risks: New Evidence and Policy Implications, 18 J Envir Econ & Mgmt S-51, S-61 
(1990) (providing evidence that workers discount future job-related health and safety haz- 
ards at a 2 percent rate); Thaler and Loewenstein, Intertemporal Choice at 92 (cited in 
note 56) (discussing evidence that discount rates vary with age, irrespective of whether 
the future outcome is a gain or loss, or whether the size of the gain or loss is large or 
small). 
4 See Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity at 134-35 (cited in note 47). There the 
authors illustrate a popular welfare model: a continuous-time welfare function, where the 
welfare of each generation is additively separable. In this model, the optimality conditions 
for public investment yield the expression: A+pg=SRTP. Here, A is a measure of pure time 
preference ("impatience"), g is the growth rate of per capita income, and p is a scale factor 
equal to the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption (for simplicity, this 
scale factor can be treated as constant and ignored). While A is constant over time, pg will 
vary with per capita income. The higher the rate of income growth, g, the higher is the so- 
cial rate of discount r. 
See id at 131, 136. 
See id. 
67 Pigou, The Economics of Welfare at 25 (cited in note 33). 
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erations, who would pay the current generation to be less myopic 
if such payments were possible. Thus, the government should 
override societal preferences in favor of intergenerational wel- 
fare." However, given that individuals are altruistic toward fu- 
ture generations (for example, children and grandchildren), it is 
unclear when the preferences of the current generation will exert 
a negative xternality on future generations.69 
In contrast, the SRTPs dependence on economic growth has 
strong economic and ethical justifications. If future generations 
will be better off than the current generation, optimal resource 
allocation suggests that the current generation should favor pub- 
lic investments with immediate payoffs over those that benefit fu- 
ture generations.70 Similarly, the ethical notion that one genera- 
tion should not sacrifice excessively for another implies that 
regulatory agencies should discount benefits to future genera- 
tions-who will be better off than current citizens anyway-when 
evaluating potential projects.7' 
b) Applying the economic theory. The SRTP is a prescriptive 
approach to the social discount rate. It assumes that society 
should maximize an arbitrarily chosen intergenerational welfare 
function,72 and then derives the social discount rate from the op- 
timality conditions of that function. This approach, however, 
raises at least three controversial ethical, political, and economic 
issues. 
First, while the OCC approach relies on observable conomic 
behavior, the SRTP rejects such evidence in favor of normative 
models of intergenerational welfare. Thus the SRTP implicitly 
assumes a market failure: financial markets provide a poor indi- 
cator of society's willingness to invest in particular projects (such 
as climate control) that benefit future generations.73 The source of 
this market failure is unclear. The failure may result from infor- 
mation problems, such as the current generation's inability to as- 
' Many economists do not believe that myopic societal preferences justify government 
intervention. See, for example, Kopp and Portney, Mock Referenda at 5 (cited in note 55). 
See also Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity at 136 (cited in note 47), where the authors 
note that a nonzero pure rate of time preference may be defensible because "as a matter of 
description, the current generation gives less value to consumption of future generations.' 
69 Once we account for altruism, the societal discount rate will be a function of the rate 
of intergenerational altruism. See Gary S. Becker, A Treatise on the Family 162-69 (Har- 
vard Enlarged ed 1991). 
70 See Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity at 131, 136-37 (cited in note 47). 
See id at 136. 
72 See, for example, the welfare function discussed in note 64. 
7 See Sjaastad and Wisecarver, 85 J Pol Econ at 515-16 (cited in note 60). 
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sess the costs to future generations (for example, pollution miti- 
gation, medical costs, and risks of mortality) if a particular regu- 
lation is not imposed.74 Alternatively, the market failure may re- 
flect myopia: members of the current generation may not care 
sufficiently about (or may not be sufflciently altruistic toward) fu- 
ture generations, who would be willing to pay members of the 
current generation to invest in particular projects.75 In either 
case, however, the government likely cannot test whether the 
market failure is sufflciently serious to warrant the normative 
approach of the SRTP, which effectively overrides observed socie- 
tal preferences in favor of a particular welfare model. 
Second, even assuming market failures warrant the SRTP 
approach, it is unclear whether an agency can identify an appro- 
priate intergenerational welfare function and whether that func- 
tion will generate discount rates that yield better outcomes than 
rates derived by the OCC approach.76 Critics claim that even the 
most simple (and popular) welfare functions yield unreasonable 
discount rates that are "glaringly inconsistent" with the observed 
behavior of governments.77 Further, if the SRTP yields a social 
discount rate that differs from the rate based on the OCC- 
thereby forcing society to invest at a rate that differs from market 
rates-government regulation may not have its intended effect on 
future generations. Society today can only control the welfare of 
the immediately succeeding generation.78 Ifgovernment oday at- 
tempts to influence further generations by investing in irreversi- 
ble projects (such as climate control technology), intermediate 
generations will merely reduce their investments in the future if 
they believe that the original investment was excessive. Such a 
reduction in investments is particularly likely to occur if techno- 
logical changes have made the original investments worthless.79 
7 See, for example, Amartya K Sen, Approaches to the Choice of Discount Rates for 
Social Benefit-Cost Analysis, in Lind, ed, Discounting for Time and Risk at 349-50 (cited in 
note 46). 
7 Id at 349. 
76 See Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity at 131-33 (cited in note 47). 
7 Id at 132. The authors further note that a "discount rate of 2% implies far more in- 
vestment han actually occurs in any country now, and thus would require a big jump in 
savings rates to finance." Id at 133. 
78 See Richard A. Epstein, Justice Across the Generations, 67 Tex L Rev 1465, 1482 
(1989); Arrow, Discounting, Morality, and Gaming at 12 (cited in note 39). 
7 This is a variant of the theory of Ricardian Equivalence, which states that govern- 
ment generally cannot force one generation to save for the next by imposing a tax or in- 
vesting in long-term assets. This forced saving will be "undone" as members of the first 
generation reduce their private bequests to future generations. For the basic theory of Ri- 
cardian Equivalence, see Robert J. Barro, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, 82 J Pol 
Econ 1095 (1974). 
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Contrary to the beliefs of some commentators,80 economic theory 
provides trong support for the principle that current society best 
serves future generations by choosing investments that maximize 
general welfare in the future, not by choosing investments that 
protect future societies against particular problems.8" 
Finally, even if a regulator can identify a proper 
intergenerational welfare function, the regulator faces complex 
methodological problems. Consider the simple welfare function 
that describes the SRTP as a function of pure time preference and 
the growth rate of per capita income. Scholars debate how to 
measure these components of the SRTP. Although the typical ap- 
proach is to derive the components from studies of individual be- 
havior, studies in behavioral economics how that individual time 
preference may vary with age, income, the type of future payoff 
(that is to say, whether the payoff is a gain or loss, or whether it 
involves risk to future lives), and the amount of time until the 
payoff.82 Indeed, some studies indicate that the SRTP may be 
much higher than scholars have generally believed and may even 
exceed the OCC.83 The SRTP theory offers no guidance here. 
Additionally, once an agency computes the SRTP, it faces 
significant difficulties inapplying the rate.'M Unlike the OCC, the 
SRTP is an appropriate discount rate for future consumption. 
Thus, an administrative agency must convert all costs and bene- 
fits of a proposed regulation into consumption equivalents; as in 
the OCC approach, the costs of a proposed regulation include the 
private investment that it displaces.85 
3. A conceptual framework. 
As a threshold matter, it seems unreasonable for agencies 
not to discount benefits to future generations in their cost-benefit 
analyses of proposed rules. To begin, without a discount rate, the 
analysis fails to account for the opportunity cost of resources that 
are diverted from private investment oward investment in the 
See Farber and Hemmersbaugh, 46Vand L Rev at 298-99 (cited in note 17). 
81 See Arrow, Discounting, Morality, and Gaming at 12 (cited in note 39). 
82 See generally Thaler and Loewenstein, Intertemporal Choice at 92-106 (cited in note 
56). 
3 See id. See also Robert C. Lind, Reassessing the Government's Discount Rate Policy 
in Light of New Theory and Data in a World Economy with a High Degree of Capital Mo- 
bility, 18 J Envir Econ & Mgmt S-8, S-19 (1990), in which the author points to evidence 
that credit card debtors pay interest rates in excess of 16 percent. 
4 See Morgenstem, Conducting an Economic Analysis at 36 (cited in note 47); Scher- 
aga, 18 J Envir Econ & Mgmt at S-66 (cited in note 58). ' See Lind, A Primer on the Major Issues at 39-55 (cited in note 46); Lind, 18 J Envir 
Econ & Mgmt at S-11 (cited in note 83). 
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proposed rule. Having no discount rate may lead the agency to 
adopt rules that reduce the welfare of future generations, because 
the resources could have been invested in assets with higher 
rates of return. Additionally, a zero discount rate biases cost- 
benefit analysis in favor of rules that impose excessive sacrifices 
on the current generation. Finally, a zero discount rate is incon- 
sistent with the observable behavior of individuals, which is ar- 
guably the best guide for policy in a democratic state. 
The choice of discount rate is primarily a matter of policy and 
secondarily a matter of methodology.' Policy judgments largely 
dictate the choice between the two competing approaches to dis- 
counting. The OCC approach assumes that succeeding genera- 
tions will be in the best position-because of superior informa- 
tion-to deal with environmental, health, or other problems. 
Therefore, the optimal regulatory policy is to maximize the 
wealth of succeeding generations. In contrast, the SRTP approach 
assumes that current society may be in a better position to deal 
with particular problems, such as global warming and nuclear 
waste storage. Thus, the SRTP overrides market prices and 
chooses seemingly suboptimal investments (relative to prevailing 
market rates of return) to ensure that future generations do not 
suffer these risks. Thus, agency choice between the OCC and 
SRTP approaches should be based, in part, on a determination 
whether current society is in a better position to deal with long- 
term problems. 
Methodological issues determine the relative costs of apply- 
ing the OCC or SRTP approaches. While the OCC approach re- 
quires detailed information about alternative financial assets and 
adjustments for taxes, risk, and inflationary expectations, the 
SRTP requires complex estimates of parameters such as the pure 
rate of time preference and the growth rate of per capita income.87 
Additionally, the SRTP approach requires an agency to determine 
the precise effects of the regulation on future consumption. Al- 
though the regulation may raise future consumption by improv- 
ing air quality or other public goods, the project may also lower 
future consumption by diverting funds from private investment. 
The agency must subtract this "opportunity cost" of the regula- 
tion, which raises precisely the same issues as in the OCC ap- 
proach (specifically, the agency must adjust market rates of re- 
turn for risk, taxes, inflation, and other distortions). 
8 This is also described in Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity at 134 (cited in note 47). 
87 Additionally, as shown in note 64, the SRTP also requires an estimate of a scale fac- 
tor representing the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to per capita income. 
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On balance, policy and methodology issues favor the OCC 
over the SRTP. Because the current generation cannot know the 
resource constraints or preferences of future generations, regula- 
tors take large gambles with scarce resources when they follow 
the SRTP approach and invest in particular environmental, en- 
ergy, or other projects that have lower returns than assets in fi- 
nancial markets. Like the Malthusian predictions of over- 
population,' these gambles may prove mistaken because they are 
based on incomplete information about market failures in finan- 
cial markets and the capabilities of future generations to contend 
with environmental nd other harms. Future generations would 
be better served (and better able to contend with future harms) if 
the government invests in rules that maximize their general wel- 
fare and enable them to make their own choices regarding the 
environment, energy, and other public goods. 
Additionally, methodological issues favor the OCC approach 
because it is much simpler to calculate and apply.89 While the 
OCC relies on observable financial market data, the SRTP re- 
quires that the regulator select a particular welfare function, de- 
rive an expression for the social discount rate, and identify em- 
pirical analogues for the parameters of the discount rate. Addi- 
tionally, the regulator must convert all benefits and costs (in- 
cluding opportunity costs) into consumption equivalents. 
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY DISCOUNT RATES 
Very few courts have reviewed agency discount rates. When 
courts have reached the issue, they have either deferred to 
agency discretion' or imposed their own judgment about dis- 
counting.9' No court has developed a meaningful standard of re- 
view for agency choice of discount rates. This is troubling because 
legislation increasingly requires cost-benefit analysis. As such 
legislation is enacted, courts will encounter challenges to the 
methods-including discount rates-agencies use to conduct the 
See generally Gary S. Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analy- 
sis with Special Reference to Education 323-25 (Chicago 3d ed 1993). 
8' See Raymond J. Kopp, Alan J. Krupnick, and Michael Toman, Cost-Benefit Analysis 
and Regulatory Reform: An Assessment of the Science and the Art 41, available online at 
<http://www.rff.org/disc-papers/PDF files/9719.pdf> (visited July 5, 1998); Morgenstern, 
Conducting an Economic Analysis at 36-37 (cited in note 47). ' See, for example, Ohio u Department of Interior, 880 F2d 432, 465 (DC Cir 1989) (de- 
ferring to Department's choice of discount rate, which is "first and foremost a policy 
choice"). 
9 See, for example, Corrosion Proof Fittings u EPA, 947 F2d 1201, 1218 (5th Cir 
1991), citing popular press-What Price Posterity?, The Economist 73 (Mar 23, 1991)-for 
the principle that if EPA discounts future costs, it must also discount future benefits. 
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analysis. Judicial review will prevent arbitrary agency decisions 
and ensure that statutory cost-benefit requirements have force. 
Without standards to cabin agency discretion, cost-benefit analy- 
sis may become mere window dressing, providing a veneer of sci- 
entific backing for agencies' arbitrary choices.92 
This Part proposes a standard for judicial review. First, Part 
A briefly indicates when a court should review agency discount 
rates. Part B then shows that significant uncertainty surrounds 
the standard of review that courts should apply to discount rates. 
In an effort o resolve the uncertainty, this Part proposes a stan- 
dard of review based on the conceptual framework developed in 
Part II. Finally, Part C illustrates the proposed standard of re- 
view by applying it to discount rates that agencies have employed 
in recent cost-benefit analyses. 
A. When Judicial Review Is Appropriate 
A court will review agency discount rates when either the 
underlying statute requires cost-benefit analysis or the agency 
relies on such analysis to justify a rule, adjudication, or exercise 
of discretion. 
Statutes increasingly contain direct or indirect requirements 
for traditional cost-benefit analysis or a less rigorous comparison 
of the costs and benefits of a regulation. Direct requirements ap- 
pear in such statutes as the Toxic Substances Control Act 
("TSCA"), which requires the agency to censider "reasonably as- 
certainable economic onsequences of the rule,"93 and the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), which re- 
quires the agency to promulgate regulations of toxins after con- 
sidering the environmental, economic, and social impact of the 
regulations.9 Similarly, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
("EPCA") requires the Department of Energy to assess whether 
an energy conservation regulation is economically justified,95 and 
' See, for example, Scheraga, 18 J Envir Econ & Mgmt at S-66 (cited in note 58) (The 
author, an EPA official, noted that "many discounting procedures are subject to manipula- 
tion.... This can lead to manipulation of the outcomes by some clever (or perhaps igno- 
rant) analyst."). 
9 15 USC ? 2605(c)(1) ("In promulgating any rule under . . . this section with respect 
to a chemical substance or mixture, the Administrator shall consider and publish a state- 
ment with respect to ... the reasonably ascertainable conomic onsequences of the rule, 
after consideration of the effect on the national economy, small business, technological in- 
novation, the environment, and public health."). 
9 7 USC ? 136(bb) defines an "unreasonable adverse effect on the environment" as
"any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, aking into account the economic, so- 
cial, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide." ' 42 USC ? 6295(o)(2)(B)(i)(I) (1994) (providing that the Department of Energy must 
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the 1996 Amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA") 
explicitly require cost-benefite and risk-risk97 analysis of all ma- 
jor drinking water regulations. Additionally, under the Un- 
funded Mandates Act,98 all federal agencies must conduct cost- 
benefit analysis of any rule requiring significant (over $100 mil- 
lion) expenditures by state, local, or tribal governments.9 
Indirect requirements for cost-benefit analysis appear in 
statutes mandating reasonable regulations, such as regulations 
that are "reasonably necessary" or that reduce an "unreasonable 
risk." In American Textile Manufacturers' Institute, Inc v Dono- 
van (the Cotton Dust case),'" the Supreme Court noted that Con- 
gress likely intends cost-benefit analysis where a statute uses the 
phrase "unreasonable risk."'0' Similarly, many lower courts have 
found requirements for cost-benefit analysis in statutory lan- 
guage calling for "reasonably necessary" regulations.'02 
Where statutes contain such direct or indirect language re- 
quiring cost-benefit analysis, courts can and should review the 
methods that agencies use, especially their choice of discount 
rate. In Corrosion Proof Fittings v EPA,'03 the Fifth Circuit re- 
viewed the EPA's choice of discount rate under the TSCA,104 and 
in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc v Herrington,'05 the 
D.C. Circuit reviewed the agency's discount rate in a rulemaking 
consider, among other things, "the economic impact of the standard on manufacturers and 
on the consumers of products ubject o such standard"). 
9 42 USCA ?300g-l(b)(3)(C)(i) provides that "[w]hen proposing any national primary 
drinking water regulation that includes a maximum contaminant level, the Administrator 
shall" analyze the costs of complying with the regulation and "[t]he incremental costs and 
benefits associated with each alternative maximum contaminant level considered." ' Id ? 300g-1(bX3XC)(i)(VI) (requiring the Administrator toconsider "[a]ny increased 
health risk that may occur as the result of compliance, including risks associated with co- 
occurring contaminants"). 
2 USCA ?? 1501 et seq. 
2 USCA ? 1532(a). 
100452 US 490 (1981). 
... Id at 510 n 30. However, in the same decision, the Court noted that statutory lan- 
guage calling for regulation "to the extent feasible" creates no obligation to conduct such 
analysis. Id at 509. For further discussion of statutory language that may or may not re- 
quire cost-benefit analysis, see Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory 
State, 103 Harv L Rev 405, 419, 435 (1989). 
"0See, for example, National Grain and Feed Association v OSHA, 866 F2d 717, 728 
(5th Cir 1988); United Automobile Workers v OSHA, 938 F2d 1310, 1319 (DC Cir 1991) 
("Cost-benefit analysis is certainly consistent with the language" of the statute.); Alabama 
Power Co v OSHA, 89 F2d 740, 746 (1lth Cir 1996) ("Although the agency does not have to 
conduct an elaborate cost-benefit analysis, it does have to determine whether the benefits 
expected from the standard bear a reasonable relationship to the costs imposed by the 
standard."), citing American Petroleum Institute vOSHA, 581 F2d 493, 503 (5th Cir 1978). 
'3947 F2d 1201 (5th Cir 1991). 
'04Id at 1218. 
768 F2d 1355 (DC Cir 1985). 
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pursuant to the EPCA.'06 Similarly, in Ohio v Department of Inte- 
rior,'07 the D.C. Circuit reviewed the agency's choice of discount 
rate in a rulemaking pursuant to the Superfund Act ("CER- 
CLA").'08 These cases as well as the Administrative Procedure 
Act ("APA")'09-make clear that it is appropriate for a court to re- 
view the reasonableness of agency cost-benefit analysis. 
Similarly, judicial review is appropriate when an agency re- 
lies on cost-benefit analysis in a rulemaking, adjudication, or ex- 
ercise of discretion, even when the underlying statute does not 
require such analysis. Case law"0 and the APA"l require the 
court to review such agency action for reasonableness under the 
"arbitrary and capricious" test. This plies that the court can 
and should review the methods-especially the choice of discount 
rate-that the agency used to perform the cost-benefit analysis."2 
This Comment, however, focuses on cases where the underlying 
statute contains a requirement for cost-benefit analysis. 
B. The Standard of Review 
Judicial review of discount rates involves two levels of analy- 
sis. First, a court will consider whether the agency action-the 
"Id at 1412-14. 
`880 F2d 432 (DC Cir 1989). 
Id at 465. 
5 USC ? 706(2)(A) (1994) (specifying the arbitrary and capricious test for judicial re- 
view of agency actions). 
"0 See, for example, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co, 463 US 29, 33-34 (1983) (finding that NHTSA abused its discre- 
tion to issue motor vehicle safety standards that "shall be practicable, shall meet the need 
for motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms"); Citizens to Preserve Over- 
ton Park, Inc v Volpe, 401 US 402, 416 (1971) (applying arbitrary and capricious test to 
agency discretion where the statute required the agency to consider "feasible and prudent" 
alternatives); National Coalition Against Misuse of Pesticides v Thomas, 809 F2d 875, 882- 
83 (DC Cir 1987) (finding that EPA abused its discretion to promulgate pesticide tolerance 
levels "to the extent necessary"). 
"'5 USC ? 706(2)(A). 
112 Arguably the APA implies that the choice of discount rate is insulated from judicial 
review because it is "committed to agency discretion by law." 5 USC ? 701(a)(2) (1994). In 
this case there is "no law to apply," Overton Park, 401 US at 410 (citation omitted); that is, 
there is no statutory standard against which a court may judge the agency's use of its dis- 
cretion. See generally, Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sidney A. Shapiro, and Paul R. Verkuil, Ad- 
ministrative Law and Process ? 5.3 at 124-29 (Foundation 2d ed 1992). However, this ap- 
proach is controversial mong scholars. Compare Raoul Berger, Administrative Arbitrari- 
ness and Judicial Review, 65 Colum L Rev 55, 77-83 (1965) (arguing that the "no law to 
apply" rationale does not preclude judicial review for abuse of discretion), with Kenneth C. 
Davis, 4 Administrative Law Treatise ? 28.16 at 80-81 (West 1958) (arguing that where 
there is "no law to apply," even abuse of discretion is not reviewable). Additionally, courts 
regularly review the reasonableness of agency discretion under the "arbitrary and capri- 
cious" test even when the underlying statute conveys broad discretionary power. See, for 
example, State Farm, 463 US at 42-43, 51-57; Overton Park, 401 US at 411-413, 417. 
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decision to discount and the choice of a particular discount rate- 
represents an interpretation of the underlying statute that the 
agency administers."13 This raises a question of law, subject to the 
two-step standard of review in Chevron USA, Inc v Natural Re- 
sources Defense Council, Inc."14 If the agency action raises no 
question of law, the court will review the agency decision for 
abuse of discretion under the arbitrary and capricious test."5 As 
this Part demonstrates, the threshold ecision to discount argua- 
bly is a question of law. In contrast, the choice of a particular dis- 
count rate is largely a matter of agency discretion. 
This Part first considers the question of law and argues that 
courts generally have reached the right conclusion when they 
have found that an agency acts unreasonably if it fails to discount 
future costs and benefits. Next, the Part considers the question of 
agency discretion, showing that courts have been unable to ar- 
ticulate a meaningful test to determine whether the agency's 
choice of discount rate is arbitrary and capricious. The Part con- 
cludes, therefore, by offering a meaningful test and demonstrat- 
ing how a court would employ the framework in Part II to take a 
"hard look" at an agency's choice of discount rate. 
1. Review of agency statutory interpretation: The decision 
to discount future costs and benefits. 
Chevron established the well-known standard of review for 
questions of law."6 A court will defer to an agency's interpretation 
of a statute if the interpretation is not contrary to the intent of 
the statute (Chevron Step One) and if it is reasonable (Chevron 
Step Two)."7 The court will apply "traditional tools of statutory 
construction" toinfer Congress's intent."8 It will test the reason- 
ableness of the agency interpretation by determining whether the 
agency considered all statutorily relevant factors and ignored 
statutorily irrelevant factors.1"9 This test of reasonableness, how- 
"3A statutory interpretation (a question of law) is reviewable under 5 USC ? 706(2XC). 
14467 US 837, 842-45 (1984). 
"' Courts may review agency discretion under 5 USC ? 706(2)(A), (D). 
"6 467 US at 837. 
...Id at 842-45. See also Ohio, 880 F2d at 464 ("As petitioners point to no CERCLA 
provision addressing the precise question in issue [the choice of discount rate], their bur- 
den is to show that the imposition of the discount rate was unreasonable or contrary to the 
statutory purpose."). 
"'Chevron, 467 US at 843 n 9. See also INS v Cardozo Fonseca, 480 US 421, 446-50 
(1987) (employing tools of statutory construction); Babbitt v Sweet Home Chapter of Com- 
munities for a Great Oregon, 515 US 687, 703-05 (1995) (same). 
"9 See Chevron, 467 US at 845; State Farm, 463 US at 42-44. 
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ever, tends to be quite similar to the arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review that courts apply to agency discretion.120 
Thus, when courts encounter challenges to agency discount 
rates, Chevron Step One implies that they must first interpret 
the statute in question to determine Congress's intent. However, 
most statutes such as TSCA and FIFRA-offer no particular 
standards for conducting cost-benefit analysis, evidencing no con- 
gressional intent as to the appropriate methods for choosing a 
discount rate. This forces courts to proceed to the next level of 
analysis-Chevron Step Two-and examine the reasonableness of 
the agency decision. 
Thus, in the few cases where courts have reviewed an 
agency's decision to discount future costs and benefits, they have 
focused on the reasonableness of the decision, not on whether the 
decision is consistent with the purpose of the statute. In Corro- 
sion Proof Fittings, for example, the court found that the EPA 
would act unreasonably if it failed to discount future benefits: 
"Because the EPA must discount costs to perform its evaluations 
properly, the EPA also should discount benefits to preserve an 
apples-to-apples comparison, even if this entails discounting 
benefits of a non-monetary nature."21 Similarly, in Ohio, the 
court found that the Department of the Interior did not act un- 
reasonably when it followed OMB guidance and discounted future 
benefits.122 In neither case, however, did the court articulate a 
standard of reasonableness. In Corrosion Proof Fittings, the court 
held simply that an agency cannot discount costs without dis- 
counting benefits;123 in Ohio, the court deferred to the agency's 
decision because it was "first and foremost a policy choice."124 
Although they lack coherent explanations, Corrosion Proof 
Fittings and Ohio reach the correct conclusion: discounting is 
reasonable; not discounting is arbitrary.125 However, the courts in 
these cases could have reached the same conclusion more simply 
by relying on the language of the underlying statutes (Chevron 
Step One). A plain reading of statutory language requiring an 
agency to consider "the reasonably ascertainable economic conse- 
quences of the rule, after consideration for the effect on the na- 
" See Ronald M. Levin The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 Chi-Kent 
L Rev 1253, 1266-77 (1997) (demonstrating that analysis of a question of law under Chev- 
ron Step Two is very similar to-indeed, may be identical to-arbitrary and capricious re- 
view). 
121 947 F2d at 1218. 
'22880 F2d at 465. 
'947 F2d at 1218. 
'24880 F2d at 465. 
'See the discussion in Part II. 
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tional economy"126 suggests that the agency should use reasonable 
methods for evaluating the costs and benefits of a regulation. 
This is precisely the conclusion in Gas Appliance Manufacturers 
Association, Inc v Department of Energy,127 where the D.C. Circuit 
considered a statute requiring that regulations be "adequately 
analyzed in terms of . . . economic ost and benefit, and impact 
upon affected groups."128 The court found that this language re- 
quired the agency to use reasonable methods in its cost-benefit 
analysis.129 As demonstrated in Part II, reasonable cost-benefit 
analysis includes positive discount rates for future costs and 
benefits. 
2. Review of agency discretion: The choice of a particular 
discount rate. 
Most courts treat the choice of discount rate as a matter of 
agency discretion.130 Unless the underlying statute calls for strin- 
gent review,131 courts will apply the APA's "arbitrary and capri- 
cious" standard of review to the agency's choice.132 The Supreme 
Court has interpreted this standard as requiring that courts take 
a "hard look" at the agency's decision, inquiring whether the 
agency provided a detailed explanation, investigated reasonable 
alternatives, and considered statutorily relevant factors and ig- 
nored statutorily irrelevant factors.133 
Although the standard of review calls for a "hard look," most 
courts have taken a "soft look""3 at agencv discount rates. In Cor- 
'26TSCA, 15 USC ? 2605(c)(1)(D). 
'`998 F2d 1041 (DC Cir 1993). 
'"Id at 1044, quoting the Energy Conservation Standards for New Buildings Act of 
1976, 42 USC ? 6839 (1988), repealed by the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub L No 102-486, 
Title I ? 101(aX2), 106 Stat 2776, 2783. 
'" 998 F2d at 1045-46. 
'"See, for example, Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F2d at 1218 n 19 (concluding that 
the EPA's choice of a 3 percent real discount rate was not unreasonable); Ohio, 880 F2d at 
465 n 46 (deferring to agency choice of 10 percent rate); Northern California Power v 
FERC, 37 F3d 1517, 1522-23 (DC Cir 1994) ("It was ... entirely proper for the Commis- 
sion to calculate the present value ... using a discount rate that focused on the consum- 
ers' value of money."). 
.1. TSCA, for example, provides for substantial evidence review. 15 USC 
? 2618(c)(1)(B)(i). 
32See 5 USC ? 706(2)(A); Overton Park, 401 US at 413-16. 
' See, for example, State Farm, 463 US at 43-44; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp 
v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 435 US 519, 549-55 (1978); Overton Park, 401 
US at 415-17. See also Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v FPC, 354 F2d 608, 617- 
18, 620-22 (2d Cir 1965). 
'3 The term "soft look" is borrowed from Richard J. Pierce, Judicial Review of Agency 
Actions in a Period of Diminishing Agency Resources, 49 Admin L Rev 61, 90 (1997) (char- 
acterizing Judge Easterbrook's dissent in Salameda v INS, 70 F3d 447 (7th Cir 1995), as 
the "soft look" position). 
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rosion Proof Fittings, for example, the Fifth Circuit deferred to 
the EPA's choice of a 3 percent discount rate because "historically 
the real rate of interest has tended to vary between 2% and 
4%."135 The court did not consider alternative measures of the dis- 
count rate, nor did it inquire whether the EPA applied this rate 
appropriately. Similarly, in Ohio, the D.C. Circuit deferred to the 
Department of Interior's choice of a 10 percent discount rate be- 
cause the choice was "first and foremost a policy choice."136 De- 
spite this conclusion, the court noted that the agency would need 
to provide a "reasonable justification" if it revised its discount 
rate in the future, although it gave no indication what such a jus- 
tification would be.'37 
The D.C. Circuit has attempted to harden the prevailing "soft 
look" by inquiring into the theory underlying agency discount 
rates. In Northern California Power Agency v FERC,138 the parties 
disputed whether the appropriate discount rate should reflect he 
average discount rate of members of society (which FERC advo- 
cated) or the cost of borrowing for city governments (which the 
plaintiff municipalities advocated).'39 After reviewing the basic 
theory of discounting and citing a popular textbook,'40 the court 
concluded that the appropriate rate should reflect the discount 
rate of members of society.'4' The court, however, did not inquire 
whether FERC's particular rate (15 percent) was a good measure 
of the appropriate social discount rate. 
Similarly, in Herrington, the D.C. Circuit invalidated the dis- 
count rate that the Department of Energy ("DOE") had used in 
cost-benefit analysis of energy efficiency standards.'42 Applying 
hard look review, the court found that the DOE failed to explain 
how it derived this rate. In stark contrast to its approach in Ohio, 
the D.C. Circuit held that the agency could not rely on OMB 
guidelines to justify its choice: "The disputed OMB circular is es- 
sentially a general instruction to government agencies and does 
not explain the reasoning behind the discount rate it recom- 
'3947 F2d at 1218 n 19. 
'36880 F2d at 465. 
137 Id at 465 n 46. 
l3837 F3d 1517 (DC Cir 1994). 
'3 Id at 1522-23. 
140 Id at 1523, citing E.J. Mishan, Cost Benefit Analysis 176 (Praeger 1976). 
"' Id ("Additionally, when determining the net present benefit of a project, a discount 
rate that reflects ociety's, as opposed to an individual's, preferences i commonly used. It 
was therefore entirely proper for the Commission to calculate the present value of the net 
benefits of the projects using a discount rate that focused on the consumers' value of 
money.') (citations omitted). 
142 768 F2d at 1410-14. 
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mends."'43 The court stressed that the "major consequences of the 
discount rate made it particularly important hat DOE fix the 
rate carefully and explain its decision intelligibly."'" Although 
Herrington critically examined the DOE's decision, the case is 
similar to other "soft look" cases because the court offers no stan- 
dard of review for agency discount rates. 
These cases show that, even where courts attempt o take a 
hard look at agency discount rates, their inquiry generally ends 
after testing whether the agency has provided at least a "tolera- 
bly terse"'45 explanation for its choice. Courts do not address the 
other, "harder" elements of this review: whether the agency ad- 
dressed reasonable alternatives and whether it considered statu- 
torily relevant factors and ignored statutorily irrelevant factors. 
Courts' "soft look" review of discount rates seems perverse when 
they will apply a strict hard look review to other elements of 
agency cost-benefit analysis.'46 The problem appears to be that 
courts lack a coherent framework for reviewing the agency choice 
of discount rate. 
In evaluating the choice of a discount rate, courts should un- 
dertake a three-step analysis. First, as Herrington requires, a 
court must find at least a "tolerably terse" explanation of the 
agency's choice of discount rate. Second, the court should inquire 
whether the agency considered reasonable alternatives. As ex- 
plained in Part II, the choice between the OCC and the SRTP ap- 
proaches is primarily a matter of policy and secondarily a matter 
of methodology.'47 The court should find that an agency abused its 
discretion if it failed to acknowledge these alternative approaches 
and explain why, in its view, policy and methodology favor one 
approach over another. Requiring such an explanation ensures 
not only that the agency's decision has a rational basis, but that 
the agency recognizes and responds to the social (and administra- 
tive) costs and benefits of a particular approach.'48 
143 Id at 1413. 
'"Id at 1414. 
' Id at 1413, quoting Greater Boston Television Corp v FCC, 444 F2d 841, 852 (DC Cir 
1970). 
"'See, for example, Competitive Enterprise Institute vNHTSA, 956 F2d 321, 323-27 
(DC Cir 1992), where the court found that NHTSA acted arbitrarily by not considering the 
risk-risk tradeoffs of new fuel economy standards. For analysis of this case, see Cass R. 
Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U Chi L Rev 1533, 1565-67 (1996). 
147 See note 86 and accompanying text. 
'"This is precisely the goal of hard look review, as explained by the Supreme Court in 
State Farm, where the Court stated that "the agency must examine the relevant data and 
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational connection between 
the facts found and the choices made.' . . . In reviewing that explanation, we must 'con- 
sider whether the decision was based on a consideration of relevant factors and whether 
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Finally, given the agency's choice between the OCC and 
SRTP, courts should examine whether the agency properly ap- 
plied the chosen method. The OCC and SRTP involve very differ- 
ent methodologies. If an agency applies the OCC, it must consider 
whether the financial markets offer assets or trading strategies 
with term structures imilar to the proposed regulation. Addi- 
tionally, the agency must adjust the market rates of return for 
taxes, risk, inflation, and distortions due to credit constraints. 
Finally, the agency should consider whether the regulation di- 
verts resources from investment or consumption. In contrast, if 
an agency applies the SRTP, a court should ask whether the 
agency converted the future benefits of the regulation into con- 
sumption equivalents. Additionally, the agency should reduce fu- 
ture benefits to account for the fact that the regulation may di- 
vert resources from private investment and thereby lower future 
consumption.149 
Hard look review of agency discount rates would not take the 
choice of a discount rate out of the hands of administrative agen- 
cies, which possess greater competence than courts in this area. 
Nor would hard look review tax judicial resources or require 
judges to develop special expertise. Rather, hard look review of 
agency choice of discount rates asks a series of simple questions 
that courts generally ask when reviewing agency discretion: Is 
there a record?150 Did the agency explain its choice between the 
relevant alternatives, the SRTP and OCC?151 Did the agency con- 
sider the relevant factors in applying either method?152 
Admittedly, hard look review of agency discount rates will 
raise both the cost of judicial review and the cost of conducting 
cost-benefit analysis. However, the costs of judicial review will 
there has been a clear error of judgment." 463 US at 43 (citations omitted). 
"'IHard look review should be particularly strict when an agency applies the SRTP. 
This method raises more difficult policy issues and creates more complex methodological 
problems than the OCC. Most academic studies indicate that agencies have very little ex- 
perience applying this method. See Kopp, Krupnick, and Toman, Cost-Benefit Analysis 
and Regulatory Reform at 41 (cited in note 89). 
"50See, for example, State Farm, 463 US at 43 ("We will ... uphold a decision of less 
than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned.") (citations omitted); 
SEC v Chenery, 318 US 80, 94 (1943) ("[T]he orderly functioning of the process of review 
requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed 
and adequately sustained."). 
161 See, for example, State Farm, 463 US at 43 ("Normally, an [agency decision] would 
be arbitrary and capricious if the agency ... entirely failed to consider an important as- 
pect of the problem."); Scenic Hudson, 354 F2d at 624-25 ("The record as it comes to us 
fails markedly to make out a case for the [agency decision] on, among other matters, costs, 
public convenience and necessity, and absence of reasonable alternatives."). 
'62 See, for example, Overton Park, 401 US at 416 ("[T]he court must consider whether 
the [agency] decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors."). 
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rise only because courts to date have not given serious considera- 
tion to agency discount rates. This increased cost is not problem- 
atic, because both the APA'53 and case law"M require the level of 
serious consideration implied by hard look review. 
Additionally, although hard look review will impose costs on 
agencies by requiring them to prepare detailed explanations of 
their discount rate choices, these added costs are outweighed by 
the benefits to society from more careful, reasoned consideration 
of the methods used in cost-benefit analysis. A primary goal of 
cost-benefit analysis is to help agencies identify the advantages 
and disadvantages of various regulatory strategies and thereby 
allocate their scarce budgetary resources toward regulations that 
best promote social welfare.'55 By rationalizing and disciplining 
agency decision making, cost-benefit analysis promotes the 
regulatory efficiency as well as the political accountability of 
agencies.'56 Yet, when agencies lack meaningful standards for 
conducting the analysis, cost-benefit analysis is subject to ma- 
nipulation, may be ridden with error, and has the appearance of 
mere window dressing.'57 Hard look review, therefore, strength- 
ens cost-benefit analysis by giving agencies strong incentives to 
develop consistent and theoretically sound methods of analysis. 
C. Applying the Standard of Review to Agency Discount Rates 
Hard look review would significantly alter the way agencies 
select discount rates. As this Part illustrates, many recent dis- 
count rate choices by agencies would not survive judicial review 
under this standard. 
Perhaps the most interesting application of hard look review 
would involve OMB's guidelines for discount rates. Applying this 
standard, a court would find that an agency cannot rely on OMB 
guidelines to justify its choice of discount rate. Although OMB 
adopts the OCC approach and provides an adequate explanation 
for this choice, thereby surviving the first two levels of analysis 
under hard look review, OMB fails the third level of analysis, be- 
'55 USC ? 706(2XA) (requiring courts to set aside agency action that is "arbitrary, ca- 
pricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law"). 
5 See text accompanying notes 13844. 
6For analysis of the pathologies of administrative decisionmaking inthe absence of 
effective cost-benefit analysis, see Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 10-29 (cited in 
note 13) and Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice 289-94 (Oxford 1997). See 
also Thomas 0. McGarity and Sidney k Shapiro, OSHA's Critics and Regulatory Reform, 
31 Wake Forest L Rev 587, 622-32 (1996) (discussing the costs and benefits of cost-benefit 
analysis). 
6See Sunstein, 48 Stan L Rev at 252-53 (cited in note 8). 
"'See, for example, Scherega, 18 J Envir Econ & Mgmt at S-66 (cited in note 58). 
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cause it does not sufficiently explain its application of the OCC 
approach. In particular, OMB advocates a 7 percent discount 
rate, unadjusted for taxes or risk.'58 
Likewise, EPA discount rates generally would not survive 
hard look review. The agency chooses radically different discount 
rates for different regulations, generally providing no explanation 
for this variation.'59 Indeed, EPA practice appears arbitrary be- 
cause it often chooses relatively high discount rates (between 7 
and 10 percent) for regulations imposing future costs'60 and low 
rates (around 3 percent) for regulations creating future bene- 
fits.161 Because the agency offers no coherent explanation for 
these choices, its discount rates would fail the second level of 
analysis under hard look review. 
In contrast, a recent DOE regulation likely would survive 
hard look review. The agency provided detailed justification of its 
discount rate in a rule setting energy conservation standards for 
certain major household appliances.'62 After reviewing the theo- 
retical and practical aspects of both the SRTP and the OCC, the 
Department entatively advocated the OCC approach, noting that 
"consideration must be given to the opportunity costs of devoting 
more economic resources to the production and purchase of more 
energy-efficient appliances and fewer national resources to other 
alternative types of investment."'63 
Not all agency choices are as simple to evaluate under hard 
look review. A harder case appears in a recent regulation by the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA"), 
where the agency established standards for valuing damages to 
natural resources and the costs of mitigating those damages.l"4 
There NOAA considered both the SRTP and OCC, explaining the 
"68 See notes 18-20 and accompanying text. 
69The EPA generally offered no explanations for the regulations in Tables 1 and 2. 
Consider, for example, EPA, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 58 Fed Reg at 8163 (cited 
in note 30). 
"6See, for example, EPA, Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles and New 
Motor Vehicle Engines: Voluntary Standards for Light-Duty Vehicles, 62 Fed Reg 31192, 
31215 (1997) (applying a 10 percent discount rate to pollution credits that the agency will 
give to manufacturers of automobiles); EPA, Amended Proposed Test Rule for Hazardous 
Air Pollutants, 62 Fed Reg 67466, 67477 (1997) (using a 7 percent discount rate to annu- 
alize initial regulatory costs). 
'61 See, for example, EPA, LEAD; Requirements for Lead-Based Paint Activities in Tar- 
get Housing and Child-Occupied Facilities, 61 Fed Reg 45778, 45808 (1996) (using a 3 per- 
cent discount rate for "core" analysis of future benefits). 
162 DOE, Energy Conservation Program, 58 Fed Reg at 47333-35 (cited in note 29). 
163Id at 47335. 
164Department of Commerce, NOAA, Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 61 Fed 
Reg at 450-57 (cited in note 29). 
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theory and methodological issues underlying each alternative.166 
The agency ultimately advocated a 3 percent discount rate for 
valuing damages to natural resources because the rate is reason- 
able in light of existing estimates of the SRTP, the rate is close to 
the real after-tax rate of return on riskless Treasury bills, and a 
relatively low discount rate may be appropriate for goods (natural 
resources) that are not traded in a market. " Unfortunately, 
however, NOAA also concluded-without a coherent explana- 
tion-that different discount rates should apply to the benefits 
(the value of damages to natural resources) and costs (mitigation 
of damages) of restoring natural resources. While the agency ad- 
vocated the SRTP for benefits,'67 it supported the relatively high 
OCC rate for costs."6 This illogical decision should fail hard look 
review. 
CONCLUSION 
The discount rate is a critical element of cost-benefit analy- 
sis. The value of cost-benefit analysis in improvng regulatory de- 
cisions depends, in large part, on the reasonableness of the dis- 
count rate. Small variations in the discount rate can significantly 
bias the analysis. Despite the importance of the discount rate, 
courts have failed to develop a standard of review for agency dis- 
count rate choices. This is particularly troubling in light of evi- 
dence that agency practice exhibits wide-ranging, and generally 
unexplained, variation in discount rates. Not only do different 
agencies employ different rates, but the same agency will some- 
times apply different rates to different regulations without ex- 
planation. 
This Comment seeks to strengthen cost-benefit analysis by 
providing a framework for judicial review of agency discount 
rates. As a threshold matter, courts should find, as a matter of 
law, that an agency acts unreasonably if it fails to discount future 
costs and benefits, even if they accrue to future generations. Ad- 
ditionally, courts should take a "hard look" at agency discount 
rates and ask three basic questions: Is there a record for the 
agency's choice? Did the agency explain its choice between the al- 
ternative approaches to discounting, the SRTP and OCC? Did the 
agency consider the relevant factors in applying the chosen 
method? While these questions are standard fare in hard look re- 
'65 Id at 453-54. 
'6Id. 
'67 Id at 454. 
' Id at 456. 
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view, they would represent a significant advance in judicial re- 
view of discount rates. More importantly, hard look review would 
provide strong incentives for agencies to adopt morally and eco- 
nomically sensible discount rates. 
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